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Unions, Pensions, and Union Pension Funds
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role of trade unions as determinants
of: pension coverage, expenditures by firms for pensions; the
provisions of pension plans; and pension fund investments. It also
examines the impact of union pensions on the age—earnings profile of
union workers. It has four basic findings:
(1) Unions greatly increase pension coverage, and alter the
determinants of coverage, in ways that go beyond the monopoly wage
effects of unionism.
(2) Unions alter the provisions of pension plans in ways that
benefit senior workers and that equalize pensions among workers.
(3) Estimates of the age—earnings profile of union workers are
seriously flawed by failure to take account of the union impact on
pensions, which generally enhance the earnings of the oldest groups.
(4) Union pension funds can and do shun the stocks of nonunion
firmswithoutlowering the value of the portfolio. Investments in
actual projects which take lower returns are, up to a point,
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Pension plans have long been a concern of organized labor.
Some of the earliest pension plans for blue—collar workers were
originated by unions.' Following the 1949 Inland Steel decision by the
Supreme Court pensions became a mandatory bargaining topic, and the
subject of nearly all collective negotiations.2 Some thirty years
later union concerns with pensions expanded from issues relating to
workerbenefits to the use of pension fund money in the capital market,
raising new economic and legal questions relating to unioneconomic
power.
This paper examines what unions do to pensions and pension
plansin the context of the "two faces" model of unionism, which treats
unions as institutions of monopoly power and of collective voice. It
argues that the effects of unionism on pensions are better understood
by this model than by the simple monopoly perspective that permeates
much economic thinking about unions. Section one sketches out the
implications of union monopoly power and of union voice on pensions.
Section two presents a detailed analysis of the impact of unionism on
the provision of pension plans, using data from both establishment and
worker surveys. It shows that, other factors held fixed, unionism has
a significant and sizeable effect on the probability that blue collar
workers are covered by pension plans and that unionization also alters
the factors determining coverage. Section three contrasts the2
provisions of union and nonunion pension plans. Section four shows how
union pension plans alter the age—earnings profile of union workers and
thus estimates how unionism affects the earnings of workers of
different ages. Section five explores the recent efforts of unions to
direct pension fund investments away from nonunion firms into projects
beneficial to unionized workers. The paper concludes with a brief
summary. The appendix describes in detail the various data sets used
in the analysis.
I. What Unions Should Do to Pensions
The potential impact of unionism on the provision of pensions
can be decomposed into two separate effects: the effect of unionism on
pension spending that results from union monopoly power raising costs
of labor; and the effect of unionism on the pension share of a given
compensation package. Formally, let:
pexpenditures on pensions, per hour
ctotal compensation, per hour
x =diverseother factors that affect pensions
u unionism




bpu.xtotal effect of unionism on pensions (holding fixed
controls x)
bpu.cxeffect of unionism on the pension share of labor cost
(since c is fixed)
bcu.x =effectof unionism on total compensation
bpc.uxeffect of compensation on pensions, holding unionism
fixed
Differentiating between the union impact on the share of
compensation going to pensions (bpu.cx) and the impact on the level of
compensation(bcu.x) and throughiton demand for pensions (bpc.ux) is
important because the forces that determine the pension share are
likely to differ from those determining total compensation and its
associatedpension spending. Whereas the impact of unionism on total
compensation is readily analysable in the context of the standard
monopoly "face"of unionism in whichunion market power is used to
raise pecuniary rewards to workers, the impact of unionism on the
pension share is not so readily explicable. An increase in spending on
pensions with total compensation fixed necessarily means a decrease in
spending on wages or other fringes. A simple monopoly model does not
tell us whether a union would prefer pensions to wages, or vice versa.
To understand the preferences of unions for one or the other requires
analysis of the "voice" face of the institution, and the factors that
mightlead a collective democratic organization to be more (or less)
willing than workers in acompetitive setting to forgo dollars of wages
forpension benefits.4
The Voice Model
In a world in which some workers are more or less permanently
attached to firms while others are inoveable, there are good reasons to
expect the political nature of unions to lead to greater preferences
for pensions than would be expressed by workers in a competitive
market. The most important reason is that in general the union will
give greater weight to the preferences of the older, relatively
permanent employee relative to those of younger, more mobile one, than
will a competitive market in which the desires of the marginal employee
set the compensation package. In the context of a median voter model,
the union would represent the tastes of the median worker as opposed to
the marginal worker. If older presumably less mobile workers have
greater desires for pensions, the demand for pensions will then be
greater under collective than individual bargaining. Hence, firms that
engage in collective bargaining are likely to allot a greater share of
compensation to pension benefits.
Formally, I represent the postulated differential attachement
of workers to firms by an upward—sloping supply schedule dependent on
wages and pensions:
(2) L(W,P) where Lw > 0, L > 0,
where L =thenumber of workers supplied to the firm. Lw(Lp) is the
partial derivative of L with respect to w(P).
The inverse function of (2), relating wages to pensions and
employment, defines the supply price of pensions:
(3) w(P,L), w < 0, WL < 0.5
Costminimization by the firm faced with this supply price
requires, for any given L, an interior solution P such that a dollar
of pensions reduces the marginal wage cost of labor by one dollar3:
(4) W(p*,L) =—1.
The firm will provide pensions when at the optimal value the
reduction in wages covers variable costs and the fixed cost (C) of
instituting the program:
(5) LEW(O,L) —w(rt,L)]PL +C
where W(O,L) is the wage paid in the absence of pension and W(O,L) —
W(P,L)is the savings of wages from introducing pensions. According
to Equation 4, expenditures on pensions in a nonunion setting depend on
the marginal evaluation of pensions by the marginal (Lth) worker,
w(P,L). According to Equation 5 initiation of a particular benefit
depends on the change in wages W(O,L) —W(P,L)exclusive of any
potential inframarginal tLorker surplus."
By contrast, the supply price set by the union will depend on
the operation of the union as a political entity and the resultant
union inaximand. In this paper I consider two schematic models of union
behavior:a median voter model and an optimizing cartel model. Under
both models, and reasonable mixtures or variants thereof, itcanbe
demonstratedthat worker demand for pensions will be higher under
unionism.
Considerfirst the case in which the union seeks to maximize
the preference functionof the median worker. If allworkers are
orderedfrom 0 to L in terms of greatest to least attachment to the6
firm,the value of pensions to workers will be W(P,L/2).4 Cost
minimization by the firm leads to the interior solution, Pm, that
satisfies:
(6) W(Pm,L/2)—1
and to the condition for introducing the pension, P, of
(7) L(W(O,L/2) —w(P',L/2))> LP +C.
If, as assumed, marginal workers have less desire for pensions than
inframarginal workers, W(P,L/2) < W,(P,L). As a consequence pm >
and the union firm will be more likely to introduce pensions than the
nonunion firm.
As an alternative, consider the behavior of a union that, for
reasons of logroiiing and internal redistribution of benefits among
members, operates like an optimizing cartel.5 Such a union will be
assumed to maximize total worker surplus, defined as the area above the
supply curve:
(8) Lw(P,L) _f w(P,x)dx.
Maximization requires an interior solution, P, that satisfies:
(9) w(PC,L) —i/Lf0L w(PC,x)dx
=0
wherei/L f1 W(PC,X) is the average value of the pension, and the
condition for providing it is:
(10) ilLfWCP1,X)dX> P +C/L.
When the average value is greater (in absolute value) than the marginal
value, P will exceedp* When the"averagesurplus," i/Lf W(P,X)dX,
exceedsthe saving in wages W(0,L) —W(P,L),the union firm will be
more likely than the nonunion firm to initiate particular programs.7
Both of these conditions hold when WPL < 0, i.e. when, as postulated,
marginal workers have less desire for pensions than infratnarginal
workers.
Although both the median voter and optimal cartel models
represent polar cases, which ignore numerous complexities of union
behavior, they shed light on the difference between the demand for
pensions under collective and individual bargaining. The prediction of
greater allocation of funds to pensions under unionism does not depend
on the precise model of union behavior but rather on the broad
principle that, as political institutions, unions are likely to w eigh
more heavily than will nonunion firms the preferences of inframarginal
workers who tend to be especially desirous of pensions.
Additional Routes of the Union Effect
Trade unionism is likely to raise demand for pensions in
several other ways as well.First, by increasing the length of the
attachment between workers and firms (raising job tenure and lowering
quit rates) unionism will increase the likelihood that workers will
receive pensions. As a result, the value to workers will be greater
under unionism, raising the willingness of workers to forgo wages to
obtain these pensions.6
Second, in sectors of the economy in which workers are attached
to occupations rather than employers (construction, for example), or in
which firms are relatively small (trucking), unions provide the type of
large permanent market institution needed to operate most pension8
programs. Without unions (Or some comparable structure) the
probability that workers would receive deferred benefits would be too
small and the employer's startup costs too high for most benefits to be
economically sensible. What is needed are multi—employer programs, of
the type initiated by unions in the aforementioned industries, with
portability across employers and the size to reduce average set—up
costs.
Third, as argued by Freeman, Hfrschman, and Nelson, unions may
elicit more accurate information about workers' preferences than can be
gained from individual bargaining,7 which may also lead to greater
provisions of pensions. Conceptually, the adversary relation between
employers and employees ——thefact that the level as well as
allocation of the compensation package is at stake ——arguesfor
circumspection by workers in providing their employer with information
about their preferences. If employers had complete knowledge of
employee preference functions, they would seek to extract all of the
worker surplus, striking a bargain that would leave workers at their
minimum acceptance point. This provides a motivation for nonunion
employees to withold information about preferences. As the agent of
workers, on the other hand, unions should obtain a more accurate
revelation of preferences through their internal process of bargaining
over the pay package that will be acceptable to the majority of
members; in this way, unions may piay an especially important role in
eliciting employees' desire for pensions.9
Fourth, the complexities involved in evaluating the costs and
prospective benefits of pensions may make workers more willing to "buy"
them when they have a specialized agent, like a union, evaluating and
monitoring employer claims and programs. Significant investments in
knowledgethat lie beyond the purview of individual workers are needed
tojudge the true cost and future benefits of alternative compensation
packages. Union lawyers, actuaries, and related experts are one
institutional mechanism by which workers can obtain the expertise to
bargain over these diverse benefits.
Effectson Provisions of Pension Plans
In addition to influencing whether or not a firms workers have
apension plan, unionism is likely to affect the provisions of plans:
the way workers receive pensions, the amount of vesting and eligibility
requirements, the requirements on firms to fund plans. Potential
differences in the provisions of union and nonunion pension plans
provide important tests of the role of collective voice and monopoly
factors in the impact of unions on pensions. In the framework of a
simple monopoly model where unions try to obtain "more and more" of all
benefits, one could expect the provisions of union pension plans to be
more "liberal" than those of nonunion pension plans in such areas as
eligibility, vesting, and related rules.In the framework of a more
corn plex "voice" inoddunder w hich older, more senior workers have a
greater say in what unions do, one expects the opposite: benefit
provisions tilted in favor of more senior employees. One further10
expects union pension plans to be more income redistributive than
nonunion plans, making pensions less dependent on earnings and more on
seniority. Indeed, one gets an entire set of testable predictions
about pension provisions under unionism by comparing the provisions
desired by the "median" worker with those desired by the marginal
worker whose preferences determine competitive contracts (see section
f our).
II.Empirical Analysis: Provisions of Pensions
The firstandmostfundamental question is whether unions do,
indeed,increase firmexpenditureson pensions:istherea union
pension effect, and if there is, how does it compare to the union
impacton wages?
To answer these questions I have analyzed five surveys which
contain information on unionism, pensions, and related other economic
factors likely to influence pensions. One of the surveys ——the
Expenditures for Employee Compensation survey of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics ——isan establishment survey which reports whether or not
an establishment has a pension plan and the amount of employer
contributions put into the plan. Three of the other surveys are based
on the reports of individual workers as to whether or not they are
covered by pensions. The last survey, of pension plans, contains
information on the years the plan has existed, providing a different
picture of the union impact by dating the creation of the plan. While
none of the surveys is perfect, with the establishment data lacking11
information on the personal characteristics of workers and the
individual surveys lacking information on employer spending, together
they present a fairly comprehensive and uniform picture of the union
impact on pensions.
Table 1 presents the basic results of my analysis of these
various surveys. Column 1 gives the mean value of the pension variable
in each survey; column 2 gives the coefficient and standard error on
unionism in the pension equation; column 3 gives the coefficient and
standard error on log wage in the same equation. The regressions
examine four dependent variables: cents per hour spent on pensions;
provision of a pension plan; cents per hour spent for those having a
plan; and the number of years the plan has been in operation. AU of
the equations are estimated by ordinary least squares; experiments with
more sophisticated techniques yield comparable findings. All of the
calculations control for the wages paid workers, industry of
employment, occupation, and size of establishment where available; the
analyses of individual workers also control for the demographic
features of the workers.
The figures tell a clear story about what unions do to
pensions: they increase the probability that establishments or workers
have a pension plan by sizeable and statistically significant amounts1
and therefore raise the contribution of firms to pension plans. In the
E.E.C. data the union impact on the probability of a pension plan
varies from .17 in the 1973—77 tapes to .29 in the 1967—72 tapes. In
the surveys of individuals the union impact ranges from .24 to .32.12
TABLE 1: Estimates of the Effect of Collective Bargaining on Provision
of Pensions and of Employee Contributions to Pension Funds
and of the Age of Pension Plans
Data1 Years1 ObservationsSample MeanCoefficients and Standard Errors
on
Establishment Survey Collective Log





pension coverage 64% .20 (.01) .26 (.02)
dollars per hour,
all firms .19 .08 (.01) .32 (.01)
dollars per hour,






pension coverage 63% .29 (.01) (b)
dollars per hour, all .09 .04 (.04) (b)
dollars per hour,
firms with pensions .15 .003 (.005) (b)
Person Survey
3. May Current Population
Survey, 1979 (7964)
blue collar workers
pension coverage 47% .32 (.01) .23 (.01)
4. National Longitudinal
Survey of Older Men,
1976 (1438)
pension coverage 68% .26 (.02) .14 (.02)
5. Quality of Employment
Survey, 1977 (983)




age of pension plan, 10.4 6.3 (0.4)
single employer
age of pension plan,
multiemployer 13.4 1.6 (1.1)13
Table 1 Continued
(a) Wages, not log wages.
(b) Included in regression but not reprinted in published article.
Sources: Calculated from various tapes by ordinary leastsquares with
additional contols as follows:
1.EEC 1973—1977, 63 industry controls, 3 region controls,year
dummies, and log employment.
2.EEC 1967—1972, as reported in R.B. Freeman "TheEffectof Unionism
on Fringe Benefits," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 34(4)
July 1981, pp. 489—509.
3..CPS, 4 firm size dummies, age, tenure, tenure2,years of
schooling, sex and race dummy variables, 8 industry, 3 region, 3
marital status, and 8 occupation controls.
4.NLS,10industry dummies, 9 occupation dummies, 7 experience,
experience squared, race, education.
5.QES, 6 industry controls, tenure, tenure squared, experience,
race, education.
6.Department of Labor, EBS—1 files, no additional controls in
regressions.14
Given the mean levels of the provision of pensions these are all very
substantial impacts. The negligible union coefficient on pension
contributions by firms with pension plans show s, inoreover, that the
union effect occurs largely on whether or not a firm has a plan, ratner
than on contributions to a plan. This suggests that the absence of
data on contributions or levels of pensions is not a serious drawback:
if virtually all of the union effect takes the form of increased
coverage, the "are you covered by a pension plan?" questions capture
everything of interest.
How does the muon impact on pensions compare to the impact of
wages on pensions? The final column in the table shows the estimated
response of the pension variables to a change in wages. In the linear
probability equations these coefficients range from 30% higher than the
coefficient on unionism (line 1) to about half the estimated union
coefficient (line 4), depending on the survey. In the former case, the
numbers suggest that for a nonunion worker to have as good a chance of
having a pension as a union worker with the same characteristics his or
her wage must be 116 percent higher than that of the union worker. In
the latter case, the required difference is over 500%. The
expenditures regressions tell a similar story, although here unionism
has the same impact as a 28% wage increase. The reason for the smaller
relative impact of unions on expenditures is that unions have very
little effect on the pensions expenditures by tirms which have plans.
Even so, the estimated impact of unions is very large; taking the ratio
of the coefficient on collective bargaining in the expenditure15
regression in line 1 to the mean expenditure yields .42, which is over
twice the estimated impact of unionism on wages in these data (.18). I
interpret the large impact of unions on pensions (with wages fixed)
compared to wages as indicating that what unions do to pensions
involves much more than a simple exercise of union monopoly power
coupled with standard income elasticities of demand for pensions.
The regression models used to generate the union impacts in
Table 1 seek, as far as is possible, to compare workers with similar
characteristics. They answer the question: what does unIonism do to
the pensions of otherwise comparable workers?Related but somewhat
different questions are "what do unions do to the determinants of
pensions?" and "does unionism have a differential impact on the
pensions of different types of worker?" On the basis of section 1, one
could expect differences in both respects: the impact of unionism
ought to be larger among smaller firms and it ought to reduce the
effects of personal characteristics on pension coverage, as the desires
of "marginal" workers are dominated by the preferences of "average"
workers. To examine these possible relationships I have estimated
pension equations separately for union and nonunion workers in the CPS
(both blue and white collar workers included), compared the relevant
coefficients, and estimated the union impact on workers with the
average characteristics of union members and of union nonmembers from
the separate equations. The results, given in Table 2, show the
expected differences. The most striking difference in the impact of




















































Source: Calculated from May 1979 CPS separately for union and
with 3249 union and 11,884 nonunion workers.
nonunion workers,





























Worker with Union Characteristics
Worker with Nonunion Characteristics17
determinant of whether or not a nonunion worker has a pension but only
a modest factor in whether or not a union worker has a pension. Panels
A and B of Figure 1 highlight this important result by showing the
differential union impact on small as opposed to large firms. In the
C.P.S. file unions raise the probability that a worker in a firm of
less than 100 persons has a pension by 46 percentage points compared to
a bare 8 points in a firm with 1000 plus workers. In the E.E.C. file,
unions raise expenditures on pensions by 60% in firms with less than
500 workers compared to an increase of 6% in firms with more than 500
workers. This is consistent with the notion that where firms are
small, viable pension programs require a large permanent market
institution such as unions to provide deferred compensation. Other
factors whose impact on pension coverage between union and nonunion
workers differs noticeably are: sex, with being female having a
smaller impact on pension coverage in the union sector; occupation and
industry, which tend to have a smaller impact on pension coverage under
unionism. The smaller role of industry factors under unionism,
measured by by variation in coverage rates by detailed industries in
Figure 2, represents the general "standardization" effect of unionism
on personal differentials, which is also found in studies of union wage
effects.6
The only variable which has a greater effect under unionism is
wages: in the Current Population Survey wages have a higher elasticity
on coverage among unionists; however, in the E.E.C. data, they have the
same elasticity; while in my analysis of earlier E.E.C. data (1967—18
FIGURE 1: Differential Effects of Unionism on Pensions of Different
Groups
Panel A: Impact of Unionism on Pension Coverage,
by(Current Population Survey)
.46 .21__ .08
Firm Size < 100 100—499 500—999 1000 plus
(number of workers)
Panel B: Impact of Unionism on Pension Expenditure or Coverage of Pension





.25L.o.9 .2 60% 6%
Establishment Size< 500> 500< 500> 500< 500> 500
Source: Calculated from the surveys using the same model as in Table 2.19
FIGURE 2: Coefficients of Variation for Industry Differences on
Pension Coverage, Union versus Nonunion Status




Expenditures for Employee Compensation
.17 .52
union nonunion
Source: CPS, based on 44 industry coverage figures, as reported in
Kotlikoff and Smith Pensions in the American Economy, Table
3.2.9. The average coverage in the union sector was .74; the
standard deviation was .15. The rate of coverage in the
nonunion sector was .46; the standard deviation was .23.
EEC, based on 63 industries for nonunion and 61 industries for
union, with industries having less than 5 firms deleted. The
rate of coverage in the union sector was .89; the standard
deviation was .15. The rate of coverage in the nonunion sector
was .47; the standard deviation was .24.20
1972), I found a lower elasticity of wages for unionists, leading to no
clear conclusion about its effects.8Even with the ambiguous wage
coefficients, how ever, the overall pattern of differences in pension
determination in union and nonunion settings is clear: standard
personal and job factors matter less under unionism.
Finally, the summary differences at the bottom of Table 2
record the results of applying the estimated coefficients from the
equation for one group to the mean values of characteristics of the
other groups to determine predicted coverage for workers of different
characteristics under the two regimes. They show that unionism raises
the coverage of workers with the characteristics of union workers by 22
points and raises the coverage of workers with the characteristics of
nonunion workers by 26 points.
From the calculations in Tables 1 and 2 I conclude that
unionism has a positive impact on pensions which is greater for workers
with the characteristics of union workers but which is still sizeable
for workers with the characteristics of nonunion workers. Moreover, in
pension coverage, as in wages, unionism reduces the effect of personal
and sectoral characteristics on the determination of the outcome.
Additional Evidence
Cross—section comparisons like those in Tables 1 and 2 show
that union workers or establishments are more likely to be covered by
pensions than nonunion workers or establishments, but do they in fact
show that unionismtises the observed differences? Maybe unions just21
happened to organize firms with pension plans, and have no real impact
on pension coverage. In recent years, objections of this form have
often been raised about the diverse nonwage effect of unionism as well
as about cross—sectional union/nonunion wage differences. The force of
the objections depends on the extent to which analyses control for the
independent impact of variables related to unionism and the likelihood
that otnitted "unobservables" which determine the outcome are correlated
with unionism.If one controls for numerous other factors and if
omitted factors have either a random effect on the outcome or are
uncorrelated with unionism, the cross—section estimates are valid. If
these assumptions are not met, the estimates will be biased.
One way of checking the unions cause pension interpretation of
the cross—section differences is to examine longitudinal or
before/after data. While like all nonexperitnental data these data have
their own problems,9 it is important to confirm our union effect on
them.
Do firms or workers who change union status also experience a
change in pension coverage?
To answer this question I have tabulated the proportion of
workers gaining/losing pension coverage as their union status changes
in the 1973—77 Quality of Employment panel survey. The results of the
analysis, given in Table 3, reveals a union impact on coverage of a
magnitude similar to that found in the cross—section analysis, with
workers going from nonunion to union status experiencing a 34
percentage point net increase in the probability of pension coverage22
TABLE3:Changes in Whether a Worker has a Pension Plan, by Changes in
Union Status, 1973—1977
Percentage of Percentage ofNet
Workers Workers Losing Percentage
Status of Worker Gaining Pension Pension Change
(number of workers)
Union 1973, union 1977 3% 3% 0%
(1 82)
Union 1973, nonunion 1977 11% 13% —2%
(64)
Nonunion 1973, nonunion 1977 15% 10% 5%
(407)
Nonunion 1973, union 1977 41% 7% 34%
(44)
Source: Tabulated from Panel data, 1973—1977 Quality of Employment
Survey. Based on 687 workers.23
compared to essentially no change for other groups in the sample.
While one might have expected an analagous decline in the pension
coverage of workers who went from union to nonunion status, the
evidence here shows that those workers experienced only a slight
change. The reason: workers who give up a union job move to jobs with
higher coverage than the typical nonunion job. In the sample covered
77% of union—leavers went to jobs with pensions compared to 70% pension
coverage among workers who were always nonunion.
Information on pension coverage in newly organized firms
confirms the finding that unionism raises coverage in longitudinal as
well as cross—section data. In a study of recently unionized white
collar workers, the Conference Board reported that immediately after
organization 35% of the firms improved their pension programs.10
A related way of testing the union impact of pensions is to
compare the likelihood that blue collar workers have pensions in
establishments where white collar workers do or do not have pensions.
If one believes that, rather than inducing firms to set up pension
programs, unions organize "good employers" who offer such plans for
their entire work force, nonunion and union blue—collar workers should
be equally likely to have pension plans when the white collar workers
in their establishment have a plan and equally (un) likely to have a
plan when the white collar workers do not have a plan. The tabulations
in Table 4 dispel this possibility and show that much of the union
impact takes the form of unions establishing pension plans in companies
that do not have plans for their white collar workers. Regressions of24
TABLE4:An"Establishment Brothers" Test of the Union Impact on
Pens ions
White Collar Workers Union Blue Collar Nonunion Blue Collar
Have a Pension Plan Workers Have a Workers Have a
Pension Plan Pension Plan
yes (4435) 97% 91%
no (2120) 62% 2%
Source: Tabulated from Expenditures for Employee Compensation Surveys
with 2594 blue collar union establishments and 3961 blue
collar nonunion establishments.25
the difference between the likelihood of a company having a plan for
blue—collar as for white—collar workers yields a positive significant
union coefficient of .12, which is only .05 points lower than the union
coefficient estimated in Table l. While there may be something to
the company employment policy argument, it is not the dominant factor
behind the estimated union impact.
We conclude: unions do indeed increase pension coverage. The
increase is n due to the union wage effect and the normal effect of
higher wages on the purchase of pensions, nor to unions organizing
firms who happen to have pensions before organization.
III. Pension Provisions
Because unions are collective organizations whose goals are
influenced by majority rule, it is reasonable to expect not only the
existence (level) of pensions to differ betw een union and nonunion
settings but also the provisions of plans. Broadly, unionized plans
should reflect the preferences of "infra—niarginal," older or senior
workers, to a greater extent than should nonunion plans and should also
reflect other union policies, such as standardization of rates of pay,
use of arbitration to decide disputes, and so forth.
To analyze differences between the provisions of union and
nonunion pension plans, I have pulled a random sample of nearly 5000
plans from the ESB—l file of the U.S. Department of Labor and estimated
the impact of unionism on 12 important provisions, with other potential
determinants of provisions (size of plan, industry, occupation of26
workers)held fixed.12 In the sample are 4666 single—employer plans,
of whom 12% are union plans; and 212 multi—employer plans, of whom 61%
are union plans. Because choice of whether a plan is of the defined
benefit type (where workers are promised a given amount at retirement)
or of the defined contribution type (where a given amount is put into
the plan for each worker, who then obtains an amount dependent onthe
return) often dictates other provisions, I report estimates of the
union impact for all plans and then for all plans with a dummy variable
controllingfor type of plan. Inthe single—employer sample 41% of the
plans are defined benefits plans; in the multi—employer sample 71% are
defined benefits plans, but not of the standardform since einployers
obligations are limited to contributing to the fund.13 Inaddition to
analyzingthe full set of plans, I have also examined separately the
multi—employer, single—employer and defined benefit and defined
contribution plans and will report differences among them which are
lost in the regressions for all plans.
Table 5 summarizes the results of analysis of the impact of
unionism on four basic aspects of pension plans: the type of plan and
method of payment; eligibility requirements; dispute resolution; and
the nature of contributions. The analysis shows sizeable differences
between the provisions of union and of nonunion plans, with the bulk of
the differences consistent with the "collective voice" interpretation
of what unions do:27
TABLE5: Estimates of the Impact of Unionism on Provisions of Single
Employer Pension Plans
Mean Values Estimated Union Holding Fixed
Benefit Type and Payments Union NonunionEffect, Type of Plan
Standard Erroror Looking at
1. Defined Benefit .89 .35 .33 (.03)
2. Flat Rate .50 .03 .31 (.01) .29 (.01)
3. Integratedwith Social .07 .09 —.01 (.02) —.08 (.01)
Security Plan
Eligibility ReQuirements
4. Vesting more liberal .08 .47 —.12 (.03) .00 (.03)
than required by law
a. in defined benefit —.04 (.03)
b. in defined contribution .23 (.09)
5. Age and Service .56 .21 .27 (.02) .21 (.02)
Requirements for Receipt
ofPension
6.Age and Service .19 .04 .11 (.01) .08 (.01)
Requirements for Receipt
ofDesirability Insurance
7. Hours Worked Required
a. For Vesting of Full 690 565 70 (30) 40 (41)
Benefits
b. For Receipt of Full 790 510 178 (34) 113 (34)
Benefits
Dispute Resolution
8. Use Arbitration .24 .08 .14 (.02) .14 (.01)28
Table 5 Continued
Nature of Contributions
9. Employer contribution .37 .03 —.26 (03) —.08 (.02)
related to profits
10. Employer contribution .31 .67 .22 (.03) —.04 (.02)
related to actuarial
11. Voluntary Employee .46 .06 —.21 (.03) —.10 (.03)
Contributions
12. Employer Contributions.22 .08 .08 (.02) .09 (.02)
are fixed
Other Characteristics
13. Plan Size 2,865 295
Source: Tabulated from EBS—l forms of Department of Labor with
regressions including 8industrydummies, plan size, whether
planfor salaried or hourly workers (as opposed to both), age
of plan, and ratio of beneficiaries to workers, and a dummy for
multi—employerplans.29
1. Benefit type and payments
Union pension plans are much more likely to be defined benefit
than defined contribution plans. There are two "voice" reasons for
this:first, defined benefit plans permit redistribution of benefits
from workers who leave the company to those who stay and from the young
to the old, particularly when plans are first established; second,
because defining benefits rather than contributions puts the risk of
fluctuations in the market value of pension fund assets onto employers
rather than workers.
Union pension plans are more likely to pay benefits on a flat—
rate, dependent on years of service, rather than on earnings. Paying
flat—rate benefits is the pension equivalent of standard rate policies
in wages and reflects the redistributive goal of unions as a political
organization.
Controlling for type of plan, union pension plans are less
likely to take advantage of "Social Security Integration" possibilities
than nonunion plans.Since integrating a plan with social security
allows an employee to tilt defined benefits in favor of higher paid
workers by deducting from the eniployers obligation social security
benefits, one could expect unions to oppose such schemes. The data
show they do. Consistent with our results, Kotlikoff and Smith find
that only 11Z of union defined benefit plans compared to 60% of
nonunion defined benefit plans use social security integration
formulae)430
2. Eligibility Requirements
The findings with respect to eligibility are especially
interestingbecause here a simple monopoly perspective leads to quite
different predictions than does the collective voice analysis. As
noted in section 1, a simple monopoly model leads one to expect union
plans to have more liberal vesting and eligibility requirements than
nonunion plans. In fact, the opposite is true: union plans have
vesting provisions that tend to be only as liberal as required by law,
have both age and service requirements (as opposed to separate age or
service requirements) not found in nonunion plans both for normal
retirement and for disability, and require more rather than fever hours
worked for workers to be eligible for vesting or for receipt of full
benefits. Of these findings, the frailest appears to be that
pertaining to liberal vesting, which is significant only if one does
not control for type of plan. When I examined the defined benefit and
defined contribution plans separately, however, I found that unionism
reduced liberal vesting in the defined benefit plans but raisejJ in
defined contribution plans, as can be seen in the final column of Table
l5 What explains the general increased eligibility requirements
under unionism and the divergent effect on vesting in defined benefit
and defined contribution plans? Why don't unions use their monopoly
power to extract better eligibility provisions in all cases? The voice
explanation is that the eligibility rules are set to benefit the
"average" union member at the expense of the benefits. The increased
liberality in union defined contribution plans can be explained by the31
fact that, there, the absence of any such transfer among workers means
that all will favor more liberal vesting.
Finally, I have also examined the portability provisions of
plans, that is the rules governing when employees carry their service
credits to a new employer, and found differences between multiemployer
and single employer defined benefit plans. Unionism increases all
forms of portability in multiemployer plans by significant amounts,
while among single—employer plans, unionism reduces portability by
significant amounts:
Multiemployer Single Employer
Mean Estimated ImpactMean Estimated Impact
of Unionism of Unionism
Portable among .77 .16 (.09) .24 —.11 (.03)
employers in plan
Portable within .37 .21 (.11) .10 —.02 (.03)
other employers




Bere, again, we can gain insight into the causes of differences from
comparing what an "average" worker would want with what a marginal
worker would want. An average employee inan industrywithhigh
mobilitysuch as construction, where union multiernployer plans
predominate, would want portability. An average employee in a factory,
where mobility is modest and single—employer plans are found, would by32
contrast have no concern for portability. Bence, the divergent
results.As for the rigid eligibility rules under unionism, exclusion
of marginal workers will lower the actuarial cost of pensions to the
firm, permitting the senior union workers who are eligible to obtain
larger defined benefits.
4. Dispute Resolution
While neither union nor nonunion pension plans make extensive
use of arbitration to resolve disputes about claimed pension benefits,
union plans are far more likely to rely on arbitration than are
nonunion plans.
5. Nature of Contributions
Union pension plans also differ significantly in the nature of
employer's and employee's contributions to the pension fund. Union
plans are much less likely to relate contributions to profits than are
nonunion plans and are much more likely to make employer contributions
a fixed bargained amount or determined by the actuarial rate for the
plan. (The effect on actuarial contributions is due to the choice of a
defined benefit plan.) On the worker side, union plans are less likely
to involve voluntary worker contributions, largely though not
exclusively by having fixed benefit plans in which worker contributions
do not affect benefits.33
In sum, union pension plans differ greatly from nonunion plans
in ways that are, in general, explicable by the "collective voice" face
of the institution.
Levels of Benefits
Thus far we have discussed various aspects of pension plan
provisions but not actual pension benefits received.
Dounion pensioners get more?
This is a difficult question to answ er because surveys of
retireesrarely ask about the prior union status of the retirees. In
the one survey which does contain such information, the Department of
Labors 1979 Survey of Private Pension Benefit Amounts, Kotlikoff and
Smith find that union pensioners do about as well as nonunion
pensioners. Among male workers, the ratio of pension benefits to pre—
retirement earnings is .194 for union workers compared to .180 for
nonunion workers and among women, .198 (union) and .170 (nonunion).16
This is consistent with the Table 1 finding that union employers
contribute to pension plans a similar amount (wages fixed) as do
nonunion employers who have pension plans.
In inflationary times a key aspect of pension plans is the
extent to which benefits of retired workers are adjusted for inflation.
While few private plans in the U.S. contain formal provisions for cost—
of—living adjustments (COLA), it is common to grant such adjustments.34
For example, the 1980 Bankers Trust study of pension plans
showed that 69% of the plans surveyed offered some cost-of—living
adjustment to retirees between 1975 and 1980. For workers who retired
in 1965, the adjustment was 20% of their promised pension. For workers
who retired in 1970 (and whose pay and therefore pensions were higher)
the average gain was 17% whereas for workers who retired in 1975, it
was 8% •17 As inflation in the period was 63%, how ever, even the oldest
group suffered serious loss in the value of their retirement pay.
Whether union plans are more/less likely to adjust upward the
benefits of retired workers is unclear: on the one hand, the current
workers who generally ratify contracts will prefer a dollar of wage
today to a dollar of retirement benefit for retirees; on the other
hand, current workers will also prefer to have their retirement pay
indexed in some fashion. In some unions, moreover, retired workers
vote for union leadership, while in at least one they vote on contract
acceptance as well, the United Nine Workers being the case in point.
Evidence on the adjustment of pensions to inflation by union
status of the pension plan has been provided to me by Professors Steven
Allen, Robert Clarke and Daniel Summer of North Carolina State
U niversity. Table 6 shows that, in their data, unionized workers were
given better inflation protection after they are retired than nonunion
workers, implying that the desire of current workers to index
retirement pay dominates their desire to spend more on themselves and
less on retirees.35
TABLE6: Numberof Increases for 1973 Beneficiaries Between 1973—78,
and Percentage Increase in Value of Pension, by Union Status








Percentage of Value of Pension, 1973—78
All 27.1% 18.1%
Only those with increases 33.6% 26.6%
Rate of inflation of C.P.I. 63.3% 63.3%
Source: Steven Allen, Robert Clark, and Daniel Sumner, "Pension
Benefits and Inflation," work in progress, North Carolina State
University.36
IV.Implication for Earnings Profiles
Oneof the most puzzling results of union wage studies is the
finding that the shape of age—earnings profiles rises rapidly for
union than for nonunion workers, despite the presumed greater influence
of older (more senior) workers in union settings. To what extent does
this puzzle reflect the failure of the wage studies to take account of
the greater pension coverage under unionism, and the greater value of
defined benefit pensions to older workers?
To answer this question I estimate the present
value of expected pension benefits for workers of different ages and
then add the incre in the present value in a year to their income in
that year. If the increment in present value divided by the wage is
greater for older workers than for younger workers the result will be a
tilt favorable to older workers, and contrarily if the increment in
present value over wages are greater for younger workers. The simplest
formula for estimating the present value of pension wealth (Pw)is:
(11) PW AiRt/0 +r÷ m)65t
where
A =ratioof present value of pension earnings received as retiree
at time of retirement (lump sum equivalent of penion receipts)
tofinal year earnings
WRtreal earnings at year of retirement for workers t years before
retirement
m=probabilityof receiving pension due to mortality or
mob iii ty
t =yearsbefore receipt of pension37
AssumingX is fixed and that the wage at retirement rises withthe
growthof real earnings, we obtain
(12) PW AWt/(1 +r—g+
whereis the worker's current wage.
Then,for ease of analysis let W be the same for workers of
different ages ——areasonable assumption for blue collar labor ——and
take the first difference of (12) to obtain the annual increment in PW:
(13)PW AW[1/(1 +r+in — g)65t—1/(1+r—g+m)65t]
which yields
(14) LPW/W x(1/(i +r+ing))65t[r+in — g]
Aslong as r +in — g> 0, the increment in present value is positive
(that is, as long as growth of real wages does not exceed the discount
and mobility factors). Regardless of the sign of r +in — g,the change
in present value is greater for older workers since (11(1 +r+in — g))65_t
is greater for them when r +in — gis positive, and smaller when r +in — g
is negative. Hence, in this model, unions tilt the profile toward
older workers, with the tilt rising exponentially.
To provide order of magnitude estimates of the tilt, assume
that A =2,so that the lump sum value of pensions are twice a year's
final pay in that year and let r +in — gtake values ranging from .03
to .10. Table 7 presents the resultant estimates of the impact of the
changes in discounted value of pensions on the earnings of workers at
different ages. At low values of r +in—g,the difference in the
changes by age are smaller, (they are zero when r +in — gis zero);
at higher values, the gains to older workers are substantial38
TABLE 7:Changes in Earnings due to Increments in Pension Wealth
Age Earnings Values of r +m—g
.03 .05 .07 .10
25 1.00 1.9% 1.4% 0.9% 0.0%
35 1.00 2.5% 2.3% 1.8% 1.1%
45 1.00 3.3% 3.8% 3.6% 3.0%
55 1.00 4.4% 6.1% 7.1% 7.7%
65 1.00 6.0% 10.0%14.0%20.0%
Source: Based on formula M'W/WA(1 +r+in — g)t65(r+in — g)39
What happens if older workers have, as seems plausible, lower
mobility rates or are vested and thus do not lose their pension rights
when mobile? We can read the answers to these questions in the table
by applying different values of r +in — gto the different age groups.
When older workers are less mobile, the value of inforthem will be
smaller than for younger workers, reducing the relevant increase in
pension wealth for the older workers. When a worker is vested and
leaves, iniszero but so too is g, so that the value of his pension
wealth will depend solely on the discount factor. Depending on the
assumptions one makes, one will obtain different magnitudes for the
increment in pension wealth by age, with, however, a general pattern of
greater increases for older workers, as can be seen by comparing the
maximum increase for the youngest group (1.9% in the column under .03)
with the minimum increase for the oldest group (6.0% in the same
column).
Finally, is the change in earnings at different ages due to
increments in pension wealth enough to overturn the puzzling greater
impact of unionism on the wages of young as opposed to older workers?
To answer this question I have estimated the effect of unions
on log wages for blue—collar workers in four different age groups,
using the Current Population Survey, and then adjusted the union
coefficients for the omission of pensions by multiplying the estimated
impact of unionism on pension coverage by the minimum Table 7 estimates
of the income value of the pensions by age. The results, shown in
Figure 3 suggest that in these data at least the union pension impact40
FIGURE 3: Estimates of the Union Wage Differential and the









.21 .18 .14 .21
Age 25 35 45 55
Source: Estimates of the union wage advantage, from Nay Current
Population Survey, 1979 with control variables for demographic
and industry characteristics, as reported in R.B. Freeman and
J.L. Nedoff What Do Unions Do?, figure 3.1 (Basic Books, 1984).
Estimates of union impact on pension value obtained by
multiplying values in Table 7 by .30, where .30 is an
approximate estimate of the impact of unions on the provision
of pensions from Table 1.41
does not quite reverse the finding of a flatter age—earnings profile
for union than for nonunion workers, though it has a noticeable effect
on the estimated union advantage among the oldest group of workers.
While the greater provision of pensions under unionism does not
completely reverse the flatter age—w ages profile under unionism,
analyses of the impact of the full spectrum of union seniority
advantages (including health, vacation, job security) does, in fact,
overturn this result.2° Pensions are part of the union seniority
package but not the entire story.
V. Union Use of Employee Pension Funds: New Tool in Labor's Arsenal?
The assets of our pension fund represent the deferred wages of our
members and we believe that the union should have an equal voice
in managing those assets.
Aunion local president18
Goals for Union Participain in PensionFund ManagementEstablished by
AFL—CIOExecutiveCouncil
To increaseemployment through reindustrializ ationincluding
manufacturing, construction, transportation, maritime and other
sectorsnecessary to revitalize the economy,
To advance social purposessuch as worker's housing and health
centers.
Toimprove the ability of workers to exercise their rights as
shareholders in a coordinated fashion.
To exclude from union pension plan investment portfolios companies
whose policies arehostile to workers' rights.42
Proposed use of union pension funds to "advance social
purposes" and to strengthen unionism represents the major innovation in
the union pension area in the 1980s, with potentially important
consequences for the economy and unionism. Because private pension
funds are major factors in capital markets, owning upwards of 12% of
corporate equities and 27 % of corporate and foreign bonds in 1 960 and
increasing their share over time, and because union pension funds
constitute perhaps one—half of the total, many analysts and unionists
have viewed them as a potentially important weapon in the unions
arsenaL2° The press, including business publications, have called for
greater innovation in traditionally conservative pension fund
investments.In 1978 Randy Barber and Jeremy Rifkind wrote an
important book advocating that union pension fund moneys to be invested
in unionized parts of the economy, rather than in nonunion sectors,
endangering jobs of ineinbers.2 Indicative of the importance unions now
attach to pension fund investments, in 1980 the AFL—CIOs Industrial
Union Department began publishing a bi—monthly journal
Labor and Investment dealing with issues of pension fund investments.
Indicative of growing academic interest the jgurnLj.Jabor £arch
published a symposium in Fall 1981 on "Union Use of Employee Pension
Funds."
There are two important questions regarding union pension fund
investments:43
(1)Does investment in "socially desirable" areas or exclusion
"from union pension plan investment portfolios of companies
hostile to worker rights" require union pension funds to take lower
returns thanthey otherwise could earn?
(2) Are some investments in lower return projects desirable to
unionized workers and, if so, are these investments legal?
B ecause of the newness of the issues and the consequent paucity
ofdata, I can offer only tentative answers to these questions, with
far less documentation than in the other parts of this study.
Returns from Union Pension Fund Investments
With respect to the first question both theory and empirical
evidencesuggest that union pension funds can shun the stocks of anti—
union firms without lowering returns to portfolios. In theory, if the
stock exchange is an efficient market union pension funds should be
able to earn normal returns, with normal risk, by excluding a moderate
number of companies from their portfolio. If it is widely recognized
in the market that certain non—union firms offer, for whatever reason,
betterprofit prospects, their stock prices willreflect this, so that
a fund will not lose by shunning them. In a "thick" market with the
equity of thousands of companies for sale, one ought to be able to
obtain the same valued portfolio by choosing the stock of predominantly
union firms rather than those of comparable nonunion firms.44
Limited empirical evidence on the returns from investments of
pension funds which do or do not shun major nonunion companies provides
support for this argument. In 1978 the Corporate Data Exchange
analyzed the portfolios of 75 union—related pension plans and 20
employer—controlled plans and found that the former held half as much
of their portfolio in the stocks of 15 major predominantly non—union
companies, (such as McDonalds, Sears, Texas Instruments).22 How did
the stocks of these companies fare in the market? From 1977 to 1982, a
weighted average of those stocks 4j_orse than the market averages:
excluding Sears Roebuck, which performed especially poorly, and which
is bought in large amounts by the Sears Pension Fund, the nonunion
companies earned a 36% return compared to a 45% gain in the Standard
and Poors 500; including Sears, the return on the nonunion firms' stock
was 19%.23 Over this five year period, the union related plans did
well to shun the stocks of these firms. More generafly, comparison of
median rates of return for some union plans (Taft—Hartley multi—
employer plans) and nonunion plans by A.G. Becker Co. of Chicago show
rough similarities in returns on equity for the two, with union plans
earning slightly more in half the years and slightly less in half the
years (see Table 8).
The evidence thus supports the tiefficient market" argument that
unions can direct investment funds away from certain stocks without
sacrificing returns. By the same token, how ever, one expects such a
policy to have essentially no real economic impact. In a market with
milions of investors, the decision to shun certain companies is/15














Source: A.G. Becker Co., telephone interview March 3, 1983.46
unlikely to have any permanent impact on their stock prices. In short,
excluding from union pension plan portfolios nonunion companies will
harmneither the pension fund nor those firms. Its only impact will be
psychic.
Does this mean that union influence on pension fund stock
market investments is a mere chimera?
Notnecessarily. Ifunion pension fund ownershipof the shares
of a company were used to pressure management through the board of
directors, ownership could prove to be a tool in labor's arsenal.
Row ever, to do this the unions would have to invest in, rather than
shun, the stocks of major nonunion firms. Farber and Rifkind report
the results of just such an effort in 1954 when the Teamsters used
their Montgomery Ward stock in the midst of a proxy fight to convince
management to agree to collective bargaining.24 Similarly, James
B ennett and Manuel Johnson point out union use of pension funds to
presssure the bankers, insurance company executives and boards of
organization that held much of the debt of the J.P. Stevens Company to
getthe company to stop blatant, illegal efforts to prevent
unionization.25In both of these situations, it ispension fund
ownership(or influence on the owners) of company equity or debt that
allowed the unions to influence company behavior. If union pension
funds follow the suggestion of the AFL—CIO Executive Council they will
not enhance tbe impact of unions on management but, rather, reduce it.47
ActualInvestment Projects
It is in the area of specific investment projects, such as
investmentsin unionized construction designed to "create" jobs, where
union pension plans might accept, for goodreason, lower returns. This
is because such investments wifl increase employment of organized labor
only if the pension fund offers the firm more attractive loan terms
than can be gotten elsewhere.Under some circumstances union
investments in projects that earn a lower return than could otherwise
be gotten but which create jobs for union workersma! benefit union
members.
First, because some of the wage bill of unionized firms wifl go
into the pension fund, which may offsetlower returns and enhance the
financialposition of the fund. Because the greater employment may
also create added obligations for the plan, however, one can not in
general conclude that this will be the case. In the case of
construction industry pension funds, the issue depends on eligibility
rules: how much of the increased work force will stay in the sector
long enough to be vested; and on benefit rules: how many hours per
year earn workers credits for pensions; and on the rates of
contribution and the benefits paid out; as veil as on the difference
between rate of return from the investment and the best alternative.
Some pension plans may likely to do better as a result of the greater
contribution while others will not. Those that do, can justify taking
low er returns.48
The second and more important reason for union to take lower
returns is to "create," or "save" union jobs.If a union takes a
slightly lower return on a pension fund investment which employs
workers at union rates, the total return to members, consisting of the
lower return in the capital market and the higher return on the labor
market (the union wage effect) could exceed the higher return the fund
could earn with its moneys. If the goal of the union investment is to
maximize the wealth of members, taking a lower return on the capital
side can be justified. The criterion for the investment should not be
the return on capital with labor valued at the union wage but rather
the return on capital with labor valued at the ijji wage rate. In
project analysis terms, this is the "shadow cost" of labor.
The strategy may be justifiable but is it optimal? Should not
the union reduce wages to create jobs rather than offer investment
funds at an attractive rate?
Unlessthe union sets employment as well as wages, it may be
better to offer capital funds at a lower return. This is because by
controllingthe amount of the investment, as well as the return, the
union can manipulate the employer to the "optimal" discriminating
monopolist point, which it cannot do by determining wages. In the
simplest situation, where capital—labor ratios are fixed, the union can
invest in a project enough capital to hire the same number of workers
the firm would hire in a competitive market, and can extract all of the
"quasi—rent" from the firm via higher wages. From this perspective,
use of pension fund capital can augment union power in the labor49
market.
Whether investment strategies for the purpose of raising
employment are legal under the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) is, however, unclear. Plan fiduciaries are
obligated to act "solely in the interest of participants and
beneficiaries" for the "exclusive purpose of providing benefits" to
them.26 If the workers who obtain the high wage union jobs were
identical with the beneficiaries, perhaps such an investment strategy
would be legal. But in general the workers will be younger employees
and the beneficiaries older employees, and it may be that a strategy
which benefits employed union members but is possibly harmful to
pension beneficiaries is illegal. On the other hand, the enhanced
monopoly power due to strategic use of pension fund investments could
be used to benefit beneficiaries as well, even when the pension fund
return is low er.It could do this by bargaining for higher defined
benefits at the expense of the union wage differential.
Have union pension plans sacrificed returns to enhance
employmentprospects?
The limited data I have seen suggests that they have not, at
leastnoticeably. AETNA Insurance, which manages alarge Union
SeparateAccount for investment in union construction, reports earning
returns above those that could obtained in the bond market. My
discussions in Southern California with pension fund officials suggests
similar good returns, thus far, with concern over fiduciary
impossibilities making officals leary of taking lover returns for the50
sake of union jobs.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has examined the role of trade unions in: pension
coverage; expenditures by firms for pensions; the provisions of pension
plans; the impact of pensions on age—earnings profiles; and pension
fund investments. It has four basic findings:
(1) Unions greatly increase pension coverage, and alter the
determinants of coverage, in ways that go beyond the monopoly wage
effects of unionism.
(2)Unions alter the provisions of pension plans in ways that
benefit senior workers and that equalize pensions among workers.
(3) Estimates of the age—earnings profile of union membersare
flawedby failure to take account of the union impact on pensions,
which enhances the earnings of the oldest groups.
(4) Union pension funds can and do shun the stocks of nonunion
firmswithout low ering the value of the portfolio. mvestm e nts in
actualprojects which take lower returns are, up to a point,
justifiable in terms of the full economic benefits accruing to workers.51
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